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The aim of this article is to present the holding institution as an economic and taxation solution. 
This article describes the holding company, indicates its advantages and disadvantages, and com-
pares it to similar solutions. The main goal of holding companies is to change tax policies. As a result 
of these institutions, companies can change their tax status and economic situation. The holding 
institution influences the economic development of its constituent companies. The functioning of 
a holding company also has great importance for economic development. Establishing holdings is 
a worldwide trend that may be realised through various models.
Introduction
In the Polish economy, increased activity of holding 
companies is becoming common. The growing num-
ber of companies in the Polish economy has resulted in 
more intensive connections between these companies. 
This type of relationship has led companies to form 
groups of holding companies. .
According to Froud, Haslam, Johal and Williams 
(2000), mainstream economics pays disproportionate 
attention to these large private economic organisations 
given their importance in the modern economy. Their 
economic and tax aspects increase the attractiveness of 
these institutions (Poterba 2004).
Holding as a financial instrument
In the era of globalisation, holding companies have be-
come a popular and advantageous way of doing busi-
ness. Their numerous benefits have motivated many 
businesses  to  direct  their  strategy  towards  creating 
holding structures.
Capital companies operating in the fields of produc-
tion or exchange attempt to achieve their goals through 
numerous direct and indirect relationships with other 
companies  (Lichtarski,  1992).  Companies’  forms  of 
cooperation can be divided into two basic groups: co-
operation and concentration.
The main objectives of the consolidation of coop-
erative entities are to maintain the legal personalities 
of interacting entities through voluntary and reversible 
interaction. Another important objective is to main-
tain the entities’ economic independence as expressed 
through  the  typical  qualities  of  autonomous  enter-
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prises, such as immutable ownership, lack of central 
leadership and freedom in the selection of executives 
(Overesch, Wamser, 2010).
Cooperation that takes the form of concentration 
is  characterised  by  the  establishment  of  a  common 
leadership for the cooperating entities. Furthermore, 
the entities’ loss of economic independence when sub-
ordinated to the general management is assessed. An 
important feature of the concentration form is the po-
tential, in certain conditions, for the loss of legal per-
sonality for at least some of the entities (full fusion) 
(Bestmann, 200; Wöhe, 1978).
A market economy based on cooperation between 
companies, regardless of their legal status, is a  coopera-
tive form. A growing economy also involves the concen-
tration  form  of  cooperation.  According  to  Palpaceur 
(2008), this is directly related to the fact that the growing 
interest of institutional investors and banks is reflected 
in the establishment of large corporations.
The concept of holding
The  concept  of  holding  has  no  statutory  definition. 
The definition of a holding company is based mainly 
on economics and laws. It can be difficult to define 
precisely because there is no consensus on the notion 
of holding. Holding institutions will be perceived dif-
ferently by an economist, a specialist in management 
or a lawyer.
Some consider a holding company a company that 
holds shares of other companies in amounts sufficient 
to influence the decisions of these companies (Solarz, 
1992). Others consider a holding company one that is 
controlled by another entity, regardless of the method 
of control (Warchoł, 2001). However, the predominant 
view sees a holding company as a group of companies 
with the ability to impose its will by holding sufficient 
shares  (stock)  in  one  company  (Kubot,  1993;  Stecki, 
1999; Nogalski & Ronkowski, 1994). 
In terms of the foreign doctrines and economic prac-
tices in the use of this type of institution, a holding com-
pany can be defined as a structure consisting of at least 
two legally independent economic entities, one of which 
is in a position to influence the decisions made by the 
other entity as a result of an agreement between these 
entities concerning the acquisition of the capital share of 
one entity (the subsidiary) by the other entity (the domi-
nant). This agreement is called the holding agreement.
The concept of holding is an interdisciplinary no-
tion (Szumański, 1996; Vlachy, 2008) that has not been 
defined in any legal system in the world. Such attempts 
have been made only by the representatives of the doc-
trine. Attempts to define the notion of holding largely 
depend on whether it is to be considered in terms of 
economic, tax or legal aspects. Language and meth-
odological differences exist between these disciplines 
(Karolak, 2001).
In a legal sense, holding means the capital connec-
tions  that  allow  a  parent  company  to  influence  the 
activities  of  a  subsidiary  by  forcing  its  decisions  in 
a general meeting and influencing the staffing of the 
subsidiary (Szumański, 1996). An important feature of 
holding that distinguishes it from similar forms is the 
fact that the parent company does not run the busi-
ness itself; it only holds shares in subsidiaries and uses 
its rights on these grounds (e.g., in international tax 
treaties, the reduction or even exemption from tax on 
dividends paid in the source country) (Kessler, 1996). 
A characteristic feature is the holding of shares (stocks) 
or, more broadly, capital relations between parent and 
subsidiary companies (Stecki, 1999).
There  are  three  criteria  to  determine  whether 
a structure is ranked as a holding company:
1.  preparation  of  the  consolidated  balance  sheet, 
which includes an account of the financial results 
of the parent and subsidiary companies (in Polish 
law, the Act of September 29, 1994 on Accounting 
and the Law of February 15, 1992 on Income Tax 
from  legal  persons  introduced  the  possibility  of 
a consolidated balance sheet for capital groups); 
2.  possession of the majority of votes at the general 
meeting of shareholders;
3.  the ratio of the relationship to the company man-
agement, which is dependent on the decision of the 
parent entity. 
It is also worth noting the difference between a hold-
ing company and the concern, which is often identi-
fied with the holding. The concept of concern includes 
the clusters of companies in which the dominant en-
tity (the parent company) and its subsidiaries conduct 
business and specify the strategy for the entire group. 
A  significant  notion  is  unified  management.  Joint 
entities  with  legal  and  economic  constraints  within 
the  group  maintain  independent  legal  personalities 
(Stecki, 2001).Vizja Press&IT www.ce.vizja.pl
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European doctrine generally defines a concern as 
the  relationship  (grouping)  of  legally  independent 
companies under one management, which determines 
the direction of economic activity. Leadership may be 
held by a company that has obtained control over the 
other companies in the concern or by a common body 
for the whole concern (Lutter, 1995; Schmidt, 1997; 
Opalski, 1997).
When the characteristics of a group are known, it is 
possible to specify a clear distinction between the con-
cern and the holding company. Holding occurs when 
a parent company does not conduct a business itself 
but only holds shares in subsidiaries and uses its rights 
on these grounds (shares management). A concern oc-
curs when both the parent company and the subsidiar-
ies conduct business (Niels, 2010).
 
The reasons for creation
There are many reasons for the establishment of hold-
ing companies. One of the most important reasons is 
the development of the company. At some point in its 
development, a company reaches a size that makes it im-
possible (or at least difficult ) to manage. At that point, 
to continue to operate and compete in the market, the 
company must decide on a type of decentralised man-
agement. One popular way to solve this problem is to 
separate the various components of the company (sub-
sidiaries, branches, plants) into independent economic 
entities and to create a holding structure on this basis. 
This solution overcomes the problems associated with 
an excessive concentration of management while allow-
ing further coordination of the activities of individual 
(now legally independent) entities by influencing the 
parent entity in decisions about the subordinate entities 
(Haus, Berry & Karas, 1993).
Another important reason for setting up holding 
companies is the ability to use the structure as a meth-
od of enlarging the company. Business development 
is possible in two ways: through internal or external 
growth. Development through internal growth means 
that due to increased production, sales, or size of as-
sets, the company is obliged to increase its organisa-
tional size. External growth means that an entity en-
ters into various types of integrative links with other 
companies. Holding is one possible way of grouping 
economic entities. The formation of a holding struc-
ture involving capital in other entities leads to a rapid 
increase in economic potential for the company with 
much less effort than creating new businesses or inter-
nal growth (Egger, Merlo, 2011).
  An  important  reason  for  establishing  holding 
companies  is  to  change  the  profile  of  the  business 
while avoiding the risk of potential failure of a new 
enterprise by an entity that already runs a profitable 
business. In this case, a holding company is relevant to 
both financial liability and company liability (an entity 
that owns a known and respected company does not 
want to be associated with uncertain activity or a com-
pletely different area than its original business). Fur-
thermore, establishing a holding company may be the 
only possible way for a particular entity to extend its 
economic activity into other areas of the economy due 
to the legal limitations of a country, such as interdic-
tions on combining insurance activity with any other 
activity (Becker & Fuest, 2011).
One of the most important and strategic reasons for 
the formation of holding companies is the opportunity 
to use the tax benefits provided by law for holding struc-
tures. Even in countries where there are no such privi-
leges,  holding  companies  allow  individual  entities  to 
mitigate their tax burden and with a state budget based 
on consolidated balance sheets (Scheuchzer, 1994). Tax 
solutions for holdings are very important for entities 
making  the  decision  to  establish  holding  companies. 
The potential for tax savings has an important influence 
and is a major argument in favour of setting up holding 
companies, especially when these tax solutions are ben-
eficial to the interested entities (Salzberger, 1994).
The issue of tax solutions for holding companies 
is broad and complicated. Each EU country has sov-
ereign  regulations  for  holding  companies.  However, 
there are certain standards that apply to all European 
Union legislations.
According  to  Laconick  and  O’Sullivan  (2000), 
American and European corporations that are financed 
by external sources are obliged to conduct fiscal policy 
that results in savings for the entire structure on the 
capital market. However, to enable these corporations 
to do so correctly, they must first create an appropriate 
structure that allows them to achieve tax savings.
Tax theories
European Union countries can be divided into differ-
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sion are the theories of taxation of holding companies. 
The largest is the group of countries that base their tax 
arrangements on the theory of economic unity: the 
Netherlands,  Spain,  Portugal,  France,  Great  Britain 
and Ireland. Their tax regulations meet all the criteria 
necessary to treat the holding as economic unity.
According to the theory of unity, a holding compa-
ny does not have tax subjectivity. A holding becomes 
a taxpayer as a single company, and the holding enti-
ties are treated as plants of the company. All operations 
conducted by holding entities are included directly in 
the holding account. Turnover between the companies 
does not have tax consequences for these companies; it 
is considered a so-called internal turnover. Receivables 
and payables arising between the holding companies 
as independent legal entities have, from a fiscal point 
of view, a neutral character. Tax should be applied only 
to the total profit of the holding as economic unity, de-
termined on the basis of the tax balance sheet of the 
holding. In this case, a tax subject is not the parent 
company, but the holding is treated as a single com-
pany. The holding tax balance is created like the bal-
ance of a single company in which the holding entities 
are in the same position as the plants. This concept is 
the best solution to the problem of taxation of holding 
companies because the emphasis lies not in artificial 
legal creations but in the entire business, which is also 
the subject of taxation (Dischinger & Riedel, 2010).
The concept of unity is characterised by the avoid-
ance of multiple taxation of dividends, the elimination 
of taxation of unrealised profits in the holding compa-
ny and merging financial results for tax purposes. The 
income (and losses) from taxation of the holding is not 
established on the basis of the trade consolidated bal-
ance. Tax law does not make use of the balance sheet 
regulations on that issue and creates its own regula-
tions (Betten, 1987).
Another group consists of countries whose regu-
lations related to the taxation of holding companies 
are based on the theory of separation. This group in-
cludes Belgium, Greece and Italy. Their holdings can-
not count on special taxation preferences, except for 
construction, which allows them to avoid the multiple 
taxation of dividends. Holdings using this theory are 
taxed as separate taxable entities despite the fact that 
from an economic point of view, they are seen as unity. 
In this  theory, holding companies are legal persons, 
but the holding as such has no legal personality and 
is  denied  taxation  subjectivity.  Despite  the  existing 
relationship of subordination of the holding company 
and a uniform board, the holding company’s profits for 
tax purposes are determined in accordance with the 
theory of separation, as though the company was an 
independent entity not only in legal terms but also on 
an economic basis. The theory of tax revenue applies 
to these holdings, according to which income can be 
attributed only to individual or legal persons, not to 
an entity established solely on the basis of economic 
criteria (Scheuchzer, 1994).
In the economic operations between companies of 
a holding company that uses the theory of separation, 
internal  billing  rates  can  be  used,  which  are  differ-
ent from the market prices for identical transactions 
by independent businesses. The taxation basis means 
a shift in the profits and losses accepted for tax pur-
poses between these companies. Creating the taxation 
fiction for tax authorities that the holding companies 
are economically independent entities poses a difficult 
task  that  consists  of  price  control  between  holding 
companies to determine whether these prices actually 
correspond to the prices that, in the same or similar 
conditions,  were  agreed  upon  between  independent 
entities. In case of a negative result of this control for 
the holding companies, the tax authorities make an 
appropriate adjustment of prices and ascribe to these 
companies the profits they would gain as independent 
entities (Hong & Smart, 2010).
It must be clearly stated that the theory of separa-
tion can lead to a correction of the holding companies’ 
incomes and losses for tax purposes to limit the eco-
nomic  connections  between  them  while  completely 
ignoring the financial results of the holding company 
as a whole.
The third group includes countries that combine the 
theory of economic unity with the theory of separa-
tion, commonly known as the mixed theory (Germany, 
Denmark, Luxembourg and Poland). These countries 
have regulations preventing multiple taxation of divi-
dends and merging financial results for tax purposes. 
They lack the possibility of eliminating the taxation of 
unearned incomes within the holding company (Salz-
berger, 1994).
In most countries, the tax income of the holding 
does  not  include  the  income  gained  from  foreign Vizja Press&IT www.ce.vizja.pl
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subsidiaries. Exceptions to this rule are France and 
Denmark; some deviations to this rule can be seen in 
these countries’ legislative systems. 
Every country of the European Union has differ-
ent  terminology  for  fiscal  institutions  that  allows 
a particular form of taxation for holding companies: 
in  the  Netherlands,  fiscale  eenheid  (These  Spenke, 
Lier, 1992; Boekhorst, 2000; Wakkie & Meer, 1992); 
in Spain, regimen de declaration consolidada (Mel-
con,  1989;  Grotherr,  1995);  in  France,  régime  de 
l’Intégration fiscale, also called groupes de sociétés 
(Bouzidi & Bouzora, 2000); in the UK, group relief, 
capital gains groups, or income groups (European, 
2000; Kay & King, 1990); in Germany, Organschaft 
(Strobel,  1995);  and  in  Denmark,  sambeskatning 
(Andersen, 2000). The main objective of the intro-
duction of separate names is to maintain the special 
tax status only for those holding companies that meet 
certain statutory requirements.
Furthermore, in every EU country, the tax regula-
tions concerning holding companies differ. These dif-
ferences relate to both purely formal and practical ar-
rangements. Disparities also exist within countries that 
tax holding companies under the same theory (Becker 
& Fuest, 2011).
The tax law of each country institutes a special tax 
statute for holding companies. At the same time, each 
tax law defines its conditions and the procedure for the 
formation and rules of a holding company’s function.
Regardless of the differences in different countries’ 
solutions, there are three criteria that give a holding 
company special status for tax purposes. These condi-
tions apply to countries that base their solution on the 
theory of economic unity and tax holdings according 
to mixed theory. Holdings can benefit from the special 
tax solutions if they meet the following criteria:
1.   the parent company should have a certain number 
of shares or votes in the boards of subsidiaries;
2.  subsidiary companies must be capital companies; 
the condition does not apply to parent entities;
3.  the parent company and subsidiaries are required 
to be established in the country to which they ad-
dress the request to be granted special tax status.
The first condition relating to ownership by the parent 
entity of a specific share in the subsidiaries is implement-
ed in different ways. The minimum participation rate in 
different countries varies, and the discrepancies are quite 
significant.  The  least  acceptable  contribution  is  75%, 
whereas the highest reaches 100% (Salzberger, 1994). 
It should be noted that the above-mentioned con-
ditions are the criteria applicable in all special tax in-
stitutions of EU countries. However, they are not the 
only conditions that must be met. Holding companies 
must meet a number of other criteria to obtain spe-
cial tax status.
Tax aspects of the functioning of holding 
companies
When the holding is treated as a unity, it can achieve 
the following benefits:
1.  avoiding multiple taxation of dividends paid the 
parent company by subsidiaries;
2.  merging, for tax purposes, the financial results of 
subsidiaries of the holding, including profits and 
losses;
3.  eliminating the taxation of unearned profits arising 
from a turnover within the holding.
These  objectives  can  be  achieved  by  drawing  up 
a holding tax balance based on the consolidated trad-
ing balance. It is also possible to use another method, 
which, for tax purposes, consists of determining the 
income of each holding company separately and then 
determining  their  consolidation.  This  method  does 
not  exactly  meet  the  theory  of  unity,  according  to 
which all revenues and expenses of the holding entity 
are the revenues and expenses of the holding company 
as a whole, but it leads to the same result. The effects 
that result from considering the holding a unity on the 
grounds of taxation are substantial (Knoepfler & An-
derson, 1988).
Holdings using mixed theory do not benefit only 
from eliminating the taxation of unearned profits aris-
ing from a turnover within the holding.
They can also avoid multiple taxation of dividends. 
In a situation in which holding companies are taxed 
on the basis of the theory of separation, there may be 
multiple taxation of dividends transferred among the 
holding entities. Such dividends are taxed for the first 
time in the subsidiary and for the second time in the 
parent company as income gained from the subsid-
iary profit. If the parent company pays dividends to 
companies that are its shareholders, there is further 
taxation of dividends. This problem also occurs on in-
ternational grounds, where the company that receives 80 Dominik Gajewski
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dividends is a resident of a different country than the 
company or companies paying dividends. The problem 
of multiple taxation of dividends is completely elimi-
nated if the holding company is taxed by applying the 
theory of unity. The dividends transferred between the 
companies of a holding are treated as if certain compo-
nents of the profit were moved between plants of the 
same company. Therefore, they represent an internal 
transfer of the capital and, from a tax point of view, are 
completely neutral (Salzberger, 1994).
For  tax  purposes,  merging  the  financial  results  of 
subsidiaries of a holding to tax the consolidated finan-
cial results is significant, especially from the point of 
view of the covering losses of companies. When using 
the theory of separation, the holding company may cov-
er its loss incurred in a particular tax year with income 
that will be obtained in the next years (losses transferred 
forward) or, if legally possible, with income gained in 
previous tax years (losses transferred backward). This is 
interperiodical covering of losses. However, there is no 
possibility of interpersonal covering of losses between 
independent legal entities (Dolton & Saunders, 1995). 
In a situation in which some part of the holding compa-
ny gains income  while the holding company as a whole 
suffers a loss, the income of a holding is taxed that, on 
balance, has not appeared at all. Only when covering 
the losses of one holding company with the income of 
others, as postulated by the theory of unity, the income 
achieved by the holding company as a whole is taxable 
(Scheuchzer, 1994).
Eliminating the taxation of unearned incomes 
within the holding company 
According to the theory of separation, sales between 
the entities of a holding mean the realisation of profits 
by the entity that makes the sale. The profit is subject to 
taxation. From the perspective of a holding company 
as a whole, there is no profit; there was a profit in the 
company as the result of transfer of certain assets be-
tween its entities. Treating sales between holding com-
panies as sales between independent companies leads 
to a situation in which, from the perspective of the 
holding company as a whole, taxable income in some 
years is fictitiously overestimated (a holding company 
making  sales  to  another  holding  company  achieves 
income), whereas in other years it is fictitiously un-
derestimated (a holding company purchasing a fixed 
asset from another holding company obtains deprecia-
tion from the purchase price). From the perspective of 
a holding company as a whole, profit is realised only 
when the commodity comes out of circulation within 
the holding. This result occurs when using the theory 
of  unity,  according  to  which  circulation  within  the 
holding company has a neutral character from a taxa-
tion perspective (Scheuchzer, 1994).
Summary
In  the  majority  of  European  Union  countries,  the 
institution of holding has become a frequently used 
form to optimise taxation. Holding companies plan-
ning their locations ignore EU countries, which lack 
tax-beneficial solutions. Therefore, countries using the 
theory of separation try to attract holdings with other 
tax benefits and locate them in their territories.
In the era of globalisation, capital companies use 
the institution of holding to shape their tax policy. Tax 
optimisation allows them to achieve large savings dur-
ing the fiscal year, which constitute significant value 
in the context of all revenues. This is one of the most 
important  arguments  in  favour  of  merging  holding 
structures.
  According  to  Clausing  (2007),  highly  developed 
countries, such as the OECD and the EU, frequently 
create tax solutions favourable for corporations. These 
countries have no choice because the areas of tax ha-
vens present serious competition for them. 
As emphasised by Devereux, Lackwood and Redo 
(2008), the harmonisation of policies on income tax 
of legal persons may be particularly useful during the 
current global crisis. Tax revenues resulting from the 
activity of holdings represent a significant part in the 
budgets of EU countries. 
Tax regulations concerning holding companies are 
likely to be reformed to unify these rules. Current rules 
concerning the taxation of holding companies in differ-
ent countries are so diverse that companies interested 
in this matter do not consider whether it is worthwhile 
to use these solutions but rather consider in which 
country to locate the parent company. It seems that the 
most appropriate way of implementing reforms will be 
to sanction holding tax law in EU community law.
Another consideration is whether a holding should 
obtain legal subjectivity, which will make it subject to 
rights and obligations, including tax liability. It should Vizja Press&IT www.ce.vizja.pl
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be remembered that the main objective of establishing 
a holding is to optimise the taxation of its entities. 
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